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INTRODUCTION 
Disputes over insurance claims are notoriously difficult for consumers 
to successfully navigate, especially in the context of automobile insurance. 
Public perception of this truism is fueled by the insurance industry’s 
reputation for utilizing every weapon in its well-stocked arsenal to avoid 
and minimize payment of claims.1 Further, research has revealed that 
consumers of insurance frequently do not understand even the basic terms 
of their policies and thus can be easily taken advantage of by insurance 
  
* J.D. Candidate 2014, William & Mary Law School; B.A. 2007, University of Virginia. 
 1. See, e.g., JAY M. FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES 
DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010).  
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companies.2 Consumers accept imperfect information about their policies 
because non-price terms of coverage are often complicated, and in some 
cases, auto insurance purchases must be made quickly—in conjunction with 
the purchase of an automobile.3  
Although consumers typically lack a full and complete understanding 
of their policies, auto insurance injury claims are commonplace in American 
society, and make up a much larger percentage of claims than those 
occurring in other contexts.4 Not surprisingly, disputes over the terms of 
coverage arise frequently. The outcomes of these disputes often turn on 
exactly which avenues are available to consumers to contest and appeal the 
final coverage determinations made by their auto insurers.  
This paper explores the current options available to American auto 
insurance consumers looking to appeal perceived mishandling of submitted 
first-party claims by insurers and proposes an improved dispute resolution 
system.5 It begins in Part I by introducing the law of consumer auto 
insurance contracts and explaining the process through which consumers 
may submit complaints against their auto insurers to state regulators. This 
typically takes the form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), termed 
“mediation,” and in certain cases may lead to a more formal complaint 
process: when a violation is found, the department may issue a direct order 
to the company. It then describes the private, policy-mandated arbitration 
system—another form of ADR—where these disputes often end up if 
consumers choose to exercise their contractual right to review. Finally, this 
paper provides insight into the state regulatory system as it currently 
operates, describing the system’s operational troubles and briefly 
canvassing alternative proposals for insurance regulation in the United 
States.  
Moving on from the current landscape of consumer auto insurance 
claim disputes, Part II describes three related phenomena that inform this 
paper’s proposal for a revised system of auto insurance dispute resolution: 
  
 2. See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable 
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 305 (1998). 
 3. See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance 
Regulation?: Against Regulatory Competition in Insurance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1745 
(2010). 
 4. See Jennifer Wiggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies: Driving, 
Insurance, Torts, and Changing the “Choice Architecture” of Auto Insurance Pricing, 44 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 69, 79-80 (2010); see also Jeffrey E. Thomas, Insurance Law Between 
Business and Consumer Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 353, 355 (2010) (noting that auto insurance 
makes up the largest portion of the property and casualty insurance market, accounting for 
36% of net premiums in 2008). 
 5. First-party insurance protects against damage to personal property and personal 
injury, as opposed to liability insurance, which protects insureds against claims brought by 
third parties. TOM BAKER & KYLE D. LOGUE, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 133, 305 (3d ed. 2013). 
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(1) increased use of online dispute resolution (ODR) generally; (2) Israel’s 
Benoam system of auto insurance dispute resolution; and (3) the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) for resolving consumer 
financial disputes. Part III proposes combining state-run consumer 
complaint review with the private arbitration system to create a federally 
administered program of online dispute resolution for auto insurance 
consumers seeking to appeal their insurers’ coverage determinations. This 
final section draws upon the experiences elucidated in Part II to propose a 
better system of first-party consumer auto insurance dispute resolution in 
the United States—one that aims to improve upon the failures and 
drawbacks of the current system described in Part I by providing prompter 
and more economical resolution of disagreements between consumers and 
their insurers. 
I.  THE CURRENT SYSTEM (AND ITS PROBLEMS) 
A. Auto Insurance Contracts and the Processing of Consumer Complaints 
Insurance agreements between consumers and private companies exist 
in the form of a contract, albeit one to which special rules apply.6 These 
contracts are regulated by state administrative bodies, and auto insurance—
which consists of a wide variety of policy offerings and premium amounts 
and is mandated for all drivers in nearly every state—is among the most 
highly regulated lines of insurance.7 Insurance agreements are generally 
considered to be contracts of adhesion: insureds typically lack complete 
information before entering the contract—for example, they rarely have the 
opportunity to review the actual policy before agreeing to sign up with the 
insurer—and contracts “are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, which 
reduces the voluntariness of the consumer’s consent.”8 Traditionally, when 
  
 6. See id. at 1. Although contract law predominantly defines the interactions 
between the parties to an insurance agreement, scholars have made theoretical arguments for 
conceiving of insurance through different lenses. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Four 
Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2013) (conceptualizing insurance four 
ways: contract, public utility, product, and governance); Daniel Schwarcz, A Products 
Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1389 (2007) (arguing insurance policies are more aptly characterized as consumer products 
rather than contracts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and 
Social Institution, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010) (arguing that insurance policies 
should be interpreted not just as contracts, but also as social and economic instruments). 
 7. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 663. 
 8. Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law: Why Insurance 
Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 238-39 (1995). 
Rappaport argues, however, that consumers are not disadvantaged. He posits that (i) they are 
adequately protected from imperfect information by insurance companies’ information 
dissemination practices, accountability created by consumers who demand complete 
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insurance contracts contain ambiguous language, courts invoke the doctrine 
of contra preferendum to interpret ambiguities against the drafter of the 
contract: the insurance company.9 In recent years, courts have moved 
toward strictly applying this and other contract law principles to insurance 
disputes.10 Disagreements over the meaning of contract language 
traditionally go directly to courts,11 as opposed to going through the 
administrative process discussed below. This brief overview of the approach 
of courts to adjudicating disputes over auto insurance policies provides a 
necessary backdrop to the focus of this paper: prelitigation options for 
resolving disagreements over submitted first-party claims. 
The majority of first-party auto insurance disputes arise when an 
insured asserts that their insurer has failed to pay a covered claim—in part 
or in full—or delayed the payment of a covered claim.12 Insurers are 
required to act in good faith when processing claims, as the relationship 
should not be adversarial at this stage.13 If an insured consumer believes, for 
example, that their claim of injury has been wrongly denied, they have the 
option of filing a complaint with the state insurance department, the 
administrative body tasked with regulating auto insurers who write policies 
in that state.14 A department analyst is then assigned to the claim. The 
analyst is expected to review the complaint in a timely manner, contact the 
insurer to gather further information, and either mediate a resolution 
between the parties or suggest alternative options to the complaining 
  
information, and regulations; and (ii) standardization of policy offerings reduces transaction 
costs, which benefits consumers in the form of lower premiums. Id. at 240-49; see also 
Thomas, supra note 4, at 353 (“[E]ach of the fifty states has a comprehensive and robust 
system of insurance regulation through statutes, administrative regulations, and common law 
rules. . . . State regulatory regimes protect . . . consumers through market conduct regulation, 
approval of policy forms, and price regulation.”). 
 9. See Abraham, supra note 6, at 664. 
 10. See Susan Randall, Freedom of Contract in Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 107, 
110-11 (2007). Randall argues that strict application of contract law is inappropriate given 
the lack of freedom of contract in the insurance context; it cannot be said that the parties 
bargain when insurers are subject to extensive statutory and regulatory restrictions and 
insureds typically have little control over the terms of policies, as they are contracts of 
adhesion. Id. at 107-08. But see Jared Wilkerson, Student Article, Adjudicating Insurance 
Policy Disputes: A Critique of Professor Randall’s Proposal to Abandon Contract Law, 23 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 294 (2011). 
 11. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance Decisions—A Survey and an Empirical Analysis, 
35 TEX. TECH L. REV. 947, 949 (2004). 
 12. See generally Jay M. Feinman, The Law of Insurance Claim Practices: Beyond 
Bad Faith, 47 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 693 (2012) (exploring the law of bad faith in 
first-party insurance cases). 
 13. Id. at 724. 
 14. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, CONSUMER COMPLAINTS WHITE PAPER 3 
(2000) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.naic.org/store/free/CCW-OP.pdf. 
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consumer (often a pre-set arbitration process laid out in the policy).15 The 
analyst may mediate between the parties, but wields no legal power over the 
insurer at this stage of review. In the majority of cases—even those 
including apparently legitimate complaints—the analyst is unable to reach a 
resolution between the parties.16 The National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners (NAIC), an organization comprising insurance regulators 
from all fifty states,17 in its white paper describing best practices for 
consumer complaint resolution characterized the analyst’s role as one of 
“informal dispute resolution,” “advocacy” (as “clearly distinguished from 
enforcement”), and a “less legalistic” approach.18 
If the analyst concludes that the company has committed a legal 
violation in a particular case and is unable to reach a resolution between the 
parties, they may forward the matter to a department attorney or investigator 
to consider taking direct action.19 In many states, this more formal process 
begins with the department sending a demand letter to the company, for 
example, requiring immediate payment of the contested claim.20 If the 
company does not cooperate, the department can then compel the company 
to attend an administrative hearing.  
Additionally, each state has an Unfair Claims Practices Act that allows 
state regulators to file enforcement actions against insurers for handling 
consumer claims unfairly.21 If a department analyst deems it appropriate, the 
analyst may forward notice—of either one particularly egregious complaint 
or of a group of complaints that suggests a company is systematically 
handling claims unlawfully—to department market conduct personnel for 
review.22 A market conduct examination may be pursued from that point 
and may ultimately lead to litigation—if the unfair conduct is indicative of a 
“general business practice,” as opposed to the singular mishandling of a 
particular claim, and if the department determines such an action is a 
worthwhile use of its limited resources.23 The next subsection describes the 
binding private arbitration option typically available to consumers through 
  
 15. Id. at 6-8. 
 16. See Daniel Schwarcz, Redesigning Consumer Dispute Resolution: A Case Study 
of the British and American Approaches to Insurance Claims Conflict, 83 TUL. L. REV. 735, 
755-56 (2009). 
 17. The NAIC describes itself as “the U.S. standard-setting and regulatory support 
organization created and governed by chief insurance regulators from the 50 states.” About 
the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2013). 
 18. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 22.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 23. 
 21. See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 745; WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 17.  
 22. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 23.  
 23. See id.  
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the terms of their policy and often required before they may initiate 
litigation against their insurer by filing a complaint in a court of law. 
B. Arbitration 
1.  Introduction 
“Arbitration is generally defined as a system under which parties 
voluntarily agree to submit a dispute to an impartial person or persons 
selected by them or appointed by some agency they have chosen to select 
the arbitrator.”24  This arrangement is agreed upon prospectively—before a 
dispute arises—at the moment parties enter into a contract.25 The vast 
majority of state and federal courts apply a deferential standard of review to 
arbitration outcomes and will only overturn an arbitrator’s decision if: (1) 
the award was procured by fraud; (2) the arbitrator was plainly partial to one 
party or corrupt; (3) the arbitrator exceeded their powers; or (4) the 
arbitrator misconducted the hearing in such a way that caused prejudice to 
one of the parties.26  
2.  Pros and Cons 
Questions of fairness infuse the debate over arbitration in all 
contexts,27 and its now-commonplace use in adhesive consumer contracts 
has been scrutinized especially heavily.28 Professor Jean Sternlight offers 
two overarching criticisms of mandatory arbitration in consumer contracts: 
first, she expresses concern that consumers—who are sometimes unaware 
that they are consenting to binding arbitration of any and all future 
disputes—are unfairly disadvantaged by this system, where their more 
  
 24. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, 
AND TORT CLAIMS 2 (Alan I. Widiss ed. 1979). 
 25. See id. 
 26. Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration Proceedings: Judicial Review 
of Arbitration Awards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 509, 521-22 (2009). 
 27. Discussing arbitration in the context of reinsurance, Robert Magino and Anne 
Flynn list its general disadvantages as: (1) difficulty finding adequately experienced panel 
members; (2) unpredictability; (3) inflexibility (exclusion of relevant third parties); (4) 
misuse of arbitration as a tool to ultimately litigate; (5) nonuse of discovery and depositions; 
(6) gravitation towards compromise; and (7) expenses must be covered by the parties. Robert 
M. Magino & Anne M. Flynn, Alternative Dispute Resolution: A Reinsurance Perspective, in 
AM. BAR ASS’N, RESOLVING REINSURANCE DISPUTES 73, 79-87 (1989). See generally Harry 
T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 
(1986) (suggesting the legal profession should reflect on the goals of alternative dispute 
before pursuing it further).  
 28. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternate Judicial 
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 52 (1999). 
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powerful future adversaries craft and control the mechanisms for dispute 
resolution and often have the advantage of selecting the arbitrator who will 
issue the decision; and second, she criticizes the privacy of arbitration, 
arguing that justice requires dispute adjudication to be transparent and open 
to the public.29 Others have suggested arbitration clauses disincentivize 
consumers from pursuing claims30 and that companies gain repeat player 
advantage by virtue of their regular appearances in front of the same 
preselected arbitrators.31  
Finally—and of particular importance in the context of low-dollar 
first-party consumer automobile complaints—arbitration can be costly for 
consumers; most arbitration clauses require the policyholder to cover up-
front arbitrator fees, which can reach hundreds of dollars.32 If the 
policyholder seeks legal representation, they may have to pay both initial 
and ongoing attorneys’ fees.33 Arbitration often costs substantially more at 
the outset than litigation, where court filing fees are much cheaper than 
arbitrators’ fees and many plaintiffs’ attorneys will agree to represent clients 
on a contingent basis.34  
Despite these commonly voiced concerns, arbitration has proponents.35 
Supporters argue that in the context of mandatory arbitration in consumer 
contracts, arbitration provides a “cheaper, quicker, and more accessible” 
alternative to litigation, and that companies’ overall cost savings are 
returned to consumers in the form of lower prices.36 Additionally, under the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), arbitration agreements are valid and 
enforceable as long as they involve commerce,37 and nearly all fifty states 
have adopted some form of the Uniform Arbitration Act, which is nearly 
identical to the FAA.38 
  
 29. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1631, 1635 (2005). 
 30. See Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute Consumer Arbitration, Structural 
Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 188 (2012).  
 31. See Geraint Howells & Rhoda James, Litigation in the Consumer Interest, 9 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (2002). 
 32. See Susan Randall, Mandatory Arbitration in Insurance Disputes: Inverse 
Preemption of the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 253, 260 (2005).  
 33. See id. at 259-60. 
 34. See id. at 259. 
 35. Again discussing arbitration in the reinsurance context, Magino and Flynn list its 
advantages as (1) speed and affordability, as compared to litigation; (2) privacy for parties; 
(3) arbitrators typically have knowledge and experience in the disputed subject matter; (4) 
finality; (5) preservation of relationships due to its less adversarial nature than litigation; (6) 
decision-making flexibility; (7) encouragement of early-stage dispute resolution; and (8) 
reasonable damage awards. Magino & Flynn, supra note 27, at 77-79. 
 36. Sternlight, supra note 29, at 1633-34. 
 37. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).  
 38. See Huber, supra note 26, at 521. 
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3.  Arbitration of Insurance Contract Disputes 
Arbitration clauses are included in most insurance contracts.39 
Although the FAA preempts contradictory state law, courts have held that 
state laws and regulations specifically governing the arbitration of insurance 
disputes inversely preempt the FAA under the McCarran-Ferguson Act.40 
Subsequently, about one-third of states have passed laws limiting or 
prohibiting the use of arbitration agreements in insurance contracts.41 
Professor Susan Randall, who is generally suspicious of mandatory 
arbitration in the insurance context, states that arbitration of auto insurance 
disputes is appropriate given that payouts are capped, typically ranging from 
$2,500.00 to $5,000.00.42 Although she condones the use of arbitration in 
the context of auto insurance, Professor Randall cautions generally that 
insureds are vulnerable to unjust arbitration outcomes because: (1) 
companies avoid public scrutiny that would otherwise incentivize better 
treatment of consumers; (2) limited discovery prevents policyholders from 
gaining access to claim-supportive information from companies; (3) 
arbitrators are typically selected by insurers and thus may be biased; and (4) 
consumers must often bear substantial up-front costs.43 These four concerns 
fit within the two overarching criticisms of arbitration detailed above; 
unfairness and cost.  
It should be noted that although insurance disagreements in litigation 
may contain arbitration-like elements, such court-ordered dispute resolution 
techniques are typically not considered “arbitration” and thus will not be 
included in the meaning of the term for purposes of this paper.44 As used 
here, the term “arbitration” refers to the prelitigation dispute resolution 
process outlined at the beginning of this subsection.  
  
 39. See Yvette Ostolaza, Overview of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Financial 
Services Contracts, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV. 37, 38 (2007).  
 40. See Randall, supra note 32, at 269.  
 41. See id. at 270-71. 
 42. Id. at 254 n.5. 
 43. Id. at 257-63. 
 44. For example, some disputes concern disagreements over the value of damage to 
an insured’s automobile. Most auto insurance contracts include an appraisal clause, which 
allows the contesting party to hire a disinterested appraiser. See Christopher P. Leise, 
Property Insurance Appraisal: Popular but Limited Device for Ending the Fight, in AM. BAR 
ASSOC., PROPERTY INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 117, 120 (1992). If the newly hired 
appraiser values the damage differently than the initial appraiser, a court may appoint an 
umpire to resolve the dispute. See id. Because appraisers only consider damages, as opposed 
to terms of coverage, however, their role is typically not considered to be that of an 
arbitrator. See id. But see Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 760 (including appraisal in a 
discussion of arbitration of consumer disputes).  
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C. Examination of Current Regulators: State Insurance Departments 
1.  Inadequate Consumer Protection  
Some have suggested that state insurance departments underperform 
in their efforts to protect and support consumers’ interests.45 For example, 
one commentator writing in support of California’s consumer-friendly auto 
insurance industry reforms noted approvingly: “If the Department of 
Insurance fails to enforce the law or respond effectively to consumers’ 
complaints, consumers will not be ‘locked out’ of the courts with no 
remedy, as often occurs in states with lax regulators.”46 An example of this 
alleged laxity occurred in New York, where the State of New York 
Insurance Department enacted a regulation requiring auto injury claims to 
be filed with insurers within thirty days of an accident, as opposed to ninety 
days, as previously required.47 The Supreme Court of New York found the 
department’s regulation an arbitrary and capricious abuse of discretion and 
admonished the department for its apparent awareness of both the 
“difficulty applicants [would] have in complying with the rules” and the 
ease with which auto insurance companies would “avoid the payment of 
claims.”48 
Academics have suggested a variety of reasons for regulators’ 
purportedly weak support of consumers. Many state insurance 
commissioners are former industry executives, and thus some believe the 
regulatory environment is stacked against consumer interests due to industry 
capture.49 It has also been argued that the nature of the company-consumer 
relationship causes an inherent power imbalance; a small group of 
organized, highly motivated companies is better-equipped to lobby 
effectively than a large group of consumers, each of whom has only a small 
stake in a given financial service contract.50 Finally, regulators may 
ultimately be incapable of adequately vindicating consumers’ interests, as 
elected or appointed officials may lack the skills, time, political freedom, or 
  
 45. See, e.g., Harvey Rosenfield, Auto Insurance: Crisis and Reform, 29 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 69, 113, 115-16 (1998) (“‘Capture’ of the regulators by the regulated industry is 
common in state-based insurance systems.”). But see Roger M. Baron & Anthony P. Lamb, 
The Revictimization of Personal Injury Victims by ERISA Subrogation Claims, 45 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 325, 328 (2012) (“The states have . . . successfully struck a balance that 
accommodates consumer protection and also fosters an environment where insurance 
companies are able to conduct business.”). 
 46. Rosenfield, supra note 45, at 113-14 (emphasis added). 
 47. Med. Soc’y of State of N.Y. v. Levin, 712 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2000), aff’d, 723 N.Y.S.2d 133 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001). 
 48. Id. at 752. 
 49. See, e.g., Rosenfield, supra note 45, at 115.  
 50. See Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1629, 1644-45 (2011). 
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motivation to fully explore and implement the most effective consumer-
friendly regulatory policies.51  
2.  Limited Resources 
State insurance departments frequently lack adequate financial 
resources and as a result are often understaffed.52 With respect to auto 
insurance, presumably states focus their energies on policy licensing, 
market conduct regulation, and ensuring insurer solvency, as reports 
indicate that processing consumer complaints against auto insurers is not 
their first priority; a 2008 NAIC survey of the fifty states revealed that 
forty-five percent of the responding states did not process all of the 
complaints they received.53 Additionally, in its white paper on consumer 
complaint resolution, the NAIC noted, “[s]taffing and budgetary restrictions 
will affect the level of service a department can provide.”54 
Professor Susan Randall reported three startling anecdotes about state 
insurance departments in her 1999 article on insurance regulation.55 The 
Indiana Department of Insurance reported that in response to the 21,000 
consumer complaints it received against insurers between 1993 and 1997, 
only 211 warning letters were issued to seventy-two companies and only 
one disciplinary action was taken. Additionally, the California Department 
of Insurance reported that despite a backlog of 5,000 insurance consumer 
complaints, its staff had been cut and the remaining staff’s time was 
reallocated to focus on other tasks. And finally, in 1997, the Colorado 
Division of Insurance received 7,000 complaints, but issued only seven 
fines in response.56 
Notably, as states look ahead, the federal health care law and NAIC 
solvency initiatives will add to their already heavy regulatory burden. For 
example, under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), 
states may establish and run health insurance exchanges, and they must 
  
 51. See id. at 1645. 
 52. See, e.g., Angelo Borselli, Insurance Rates Regulation in Comparison with Open 
Competition, 18 CONN. INS. L.J. 109, 154-55 (2011) (arguing that open competition would 
free up the limited resources of state insurance departments for more important tasks, such as 
ensuring solvency); Max Huffman, Competition Policy in Health Care in an Era of Reform, 
7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 225, 232 (2010) (noting that many states lack the resources to bring 
consumer protection actions they might otherwise choose to pursue against insurers). 
 53. See Schwarcz, supra note 16, at 757. 
 54. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 4. 
 55. Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory 
Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 625, 661-62 (1999). 
 56. Id. 
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review insurer premiums.57 Particularly germane to this paper, states must 
also establish and run offices to respond to health insurance complaints 
from consumers.58 Although the states will receive federal funding to do so, 
it seems likely that this and other tasks stemming from the passage of the 
ACA will draw state insurance departments’ attention even farther from 
their responsibility to provide adequate assistance to auto insurance 
consumers.  
Additionally, in 2008 the NAIC took up the Solvency Modernization 
Initiative (SMI) with the goal of examining and improving state regulation 
of insurer solvency.59 As part of the SMI, the NAIC has issued a model law 
that, where adopted, will require insurers to conduct carefully prescribed 
ongoing Own Risk and Solvency Assessments (ORSA) and to submit 
annual reports detailing their findings to state regulators.60 The NAIC 
predicts that all states will have passed ORSA legislation by 2015.61 As with 
federal health care reform, oversight requirements stemming from the 
NAIC’s ORSA initiative will add substantially to the work of state 
insurance regulators in coming years.   
3.  Alternative Proposals for Insurance Regulation 
Over the years, commentators have offered a wide variety of proposals 
to improve upon the current system of state-regulated insurance. Arguments 
against state regulation include hefty compliance costs for insurance 
companies, regulatory gaps between the financial service industries, and 
difficulty competing on an international scale, among others.62 Although the 
system remains state-regulated today, the Dodd-Frank Act did create a 
federal entity, the Federal Insurance Office in the U.S. Treasury 
Department, which is tasked with monitoring and reporting on the insurance 
industry, making recommendations to the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council, and representing the United States in discussions of international 
  
 57. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Reflections on the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners and the Implementation of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 2043, 2044 (2011). 
 58. Id.  
 59. See Kelly Kirby, Supervisory Colleges: Improving International Supervisory 
Coordination, 19 CONN. INS. L.J. 149, 150-51 (2012). 
 60. Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA), NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS, 
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_own_risk_solvency_assessment.htm (last updated Jan. 
27, 2014). 
 61. Id. 
 62. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Brown, Will the Federal Insurance Office Improve 
Insurance Regulation?, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 551, 560-79 (2012); Leo Donatucci, Federal 
Regulation of the Insurance Industry: One for All and All for Who? How Federal Regulation 
Would Help the Industry into the New Millenium, 7 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 398, 403-04 
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insurance standards.63 There is speculation that the FIO will act to regulate 
insurer solvency in coming years.64   
Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, state laws regulating insurance are 
protected from federal preemption unless a federal law directly regulates 
“the business of insurance.”65 Some have argued for the repeal of the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act and the complete federalization of insurance 
regulation.66 Others have posited that insurance regulation would be more 
effective if divided evenly between federal and state control: insurance 
companies could be given the option of establishing a federal charter to 
avoid licensure requirements on a state-by-state basis, for example.67 
Alternatively, some argue that states are more reliable than the federal 
government, as they have developed the necessary expertise to regulate 
insurance effectively, and they can do so with an eye to serving their unique 
populations and economic environments.68 It has been argued that states 
could improve upon the current system by officially delegating regulatory 
power to the NAIC.69 Finally, some commentators have suggested that 
states could enter binding interstate compacts that would establish shared 
minimum standards among joining states.70 
Although the proposals made to date inform the considerations of this 
paper, none have focused specifically on restructuring the handling of 
prelitigation first-party consumer automobile insurance disputes. This paper 
concentrates exclusively on auto insurance—instead of proposing an 
entirely new system of insurance regulation—because: (1) an industry-
tailored approach to a single practice within that industry may have a 
greater likelihood of success and be received more comfortably by 
stakeholders who might not otherwise support a complete overhaul of 
insurance regulation impacting all lines of insurance (or even of the auto 
insurance industry exclusively); (2) despite its narrow focus, this paper’s 
proposal has the potential to impact the review process afforded a 
significantly large subset of insurance consumers whose options currently 
vary drastically from state to state; and (3) this proposal would have the 
effect of freeing up substantial state insurance department resources, 
perhaps improving departments’ ability to effectively regulate insurance. 
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II.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Three notable developments in dispute resolution have the potential to 
inform the processing of disputes over first-party consumer auto insurance 
claims: (1) Online Dispute Resolution (ODR); (2) Israel’s Benoam system 
of auto insurance dispute resolution; and (3) the United Kingdom’s 
Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) system for resolving financial 
disputes between companies and consumers. This Section will introduce 
and describe each in order to lay the groundwork for the proposal delineated 
in Part III.  
A.  Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) 
The first forays into ODR were driven by the need to resolve disputes 
over online e-commerce interactions.71 As these initial attempts achieved 
successful outcomes, the field of ADR began to shed its attachment to face-
to-face interactions and view ODR as a potentially useful tool. This 
evolution has taken place outside the context of e-commerce primarily over 
the last ten years.72  
Experiments with ODR have revealed certain valuable attributes of 
ODR systems. These characteristics allow the systems to simultaneously 
mimic useful elements of in-person communication while utilizing 
technology to enhance both the quality and efficiency of the ADR 
experience. Importantly, this functionality has been used in both the 
mediation and the arbitration frameworks.73 Commentators have observed 
that technology can “play the role of a ‘fourth party,’ not replacing the 
human third party, [the mediator or arbitrator,] but aiding the third party and 
perhaps enhancing third-party skills.”74 One example of this is SquareTrade, 
an ODR system that presents parties with a variety of form questions based 
on the circumstances surrounding their disputes. The parties’ answers—
which are kept confidential—are used not only to aid the mediator assigned 
to a particular case in understanding the parties’ agreements, goals, and 
expectations, but also to create a dynamic collection of live data that is 
constantly used to enhance the system’s interactions with parties overall.75 
  
 71. See generally Robert C. Bordone, Electronic Online Dispute Resolution: A 
Systems Approach—Potential, Problems, and a Proposal, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 175 
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 72. Orna Rabinovich-Einy & Ethan Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute 
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 74. Id. at 178.  
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Another example of ODR operating successfully as a “fourth party” is the 
Mediation Room. In this system, parties can meet virtually via 
videoconference while their mediator listens in, facilitates discussion, and 
selectively communicates with each party on an individual basis by sending 
them short, typed messages or displaying relevant documents on their 
screen. This setup mimics in-person mediation, but provides the mediator 
with an enhanced set of tools to guide discussion.76 A final example is the 
Benoam system used in Israel, discussed in greater detail in the next 
subsection.    
Experiences of private and government entities indicate that effective 
utilization of ODR begins with careful system design.77 For example, the 
U.S. Office of Government Information Services (GIS) was established in 
2007 to review appeals of agency rejections of citizen document requests 
submitted under the Freedom of Information Act. The staff of only seven 
prepared to handle thousands of complaints by hiring system design experts 
to create an adaptable ODR system tailored to meet their unique processing 
needs. As the GIS began to receive both information requests and 
complaints, they learned that an important part of their role would involve 
communicating with citizens to mitigate the need to process complaints—
predispute resolution, in a sense. Because their ODR system was flexible 
and designed specifically for them, it was able to effectively aid the GIS’s 
small staff.78  
If thoughtfully implemented, ODR offers numerous advantages to its 
users. First, it can provide a cheaper alternative to classic ADR techniques.79 
Additionally, it offers a more efficient and convenient alternative to 
traditional mediation and arbitration: parties do not have to travel to attend 
meetings or hearings, for example. Professor Amy Schmitz notes that ODR 
may be more efficient when systems include arbitration—“OArb”—because 
its ultimately binding effect motivates the participants in a way that virtual 
mediation may not.80 Finally, ODR affords operators the ability to create a 
tailored degree of transparency, depending on the needs of their program. 
For example, when ODR is used for both mediation and arbitration, 
administrators can offer to refrain from posting records of disputes when the 
parties reach fair settlements within two weeks. In this scenario, the system 
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 78. See id. at 190-94.  
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incentivizes quick and fair settlements and preserves ADR energies for 
more complex and protracted disagreements.81  
The NAIC noted in its 2000 white paper advising state insurance 
departments on best practices for processing consumer complaints that 
thirty-five of the then forty-eight department websites provided consumer 
complaint forms online, and seventeen websites allowed those forms to be 
submitted online or via email.82 The NAIC encouraged departments to 
accept submissions “through any mode of communication” and declared 
“[a]cceptance of a consumer complaint by email . . . consistent with the best 
practices for handling complaints.”83 Although online capacities have 
largely been used by state regulators only to process complaints and 
communicate with parties, movement towards ODR may not be an 
unnatural next step for auto insurance dispute resolution. 
B. Israel’s Benoam System 
In 2000, changes in Israel’s insurance industry prompted the fifteen 
operational auto insurers to suddenly begin litigating previously ignored 
subrogation claims. The Israeli courts were subsequently flooded with a 
high volume of fact-intensive, pleading-heavy claims between opposing 
insurance companies for relatively small amounts of money. The Israel 
Insurance Association, a private nonprofit industry trade group, worked 
with private attorneys to devise a privately run and operated online 
arbitration system. To win the buy-in of auto insurance companies, the 
system incorporated certain formalistic elements atypical of private 
arbitration, such as predetermined case timelines executed automatically by 
the online system.84 Since its launch in 2000, the Benoam system has 
successfully arbitrated over 100,000 claims.85  
The Benoam system operates entirely online from start to finish for 
each claim. All case files, pleadings, reports, and photographs are available 
online and are easily searchable.86 Additionally, the system only accepts 
subrogation claims for under a certain monetary value. The process is 
governed by a formal set of rules that dictates process norms and deadlines, 
and arbitrators are carefully selected and come from a variety of 
professional backgrounds.87  
  
 81. Id. at 240-43. 
 82. WHITE PAPER, supra note 14, at 4. 
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 85. See id. at 545. 
 86. See id.  
 87. See id. 
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Two features that distinguish Benoam from many arbitration systems 
are its ability to enforce arbitrator decisions and the availability of an 
internal appeals process that generates precedential determinations, which 
are made available to the public. Benoam operates a clearinghouse that 
allows it to transfer funds automatically from one party to another. The 
parties knowingly consent to this when they agree that subrogation claim 
disputes will be handled by Benoam. Parties may appeal to a single 
arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators; in either case, the review standard is de 
novo, and reviewers are free to consider all elements of the claim, not just 
legal questions.88 Although most complaints are handled on an ad hoc basis, 
“precedent setting cases”—often reviewed on appeal—are released to 
insurers in order to clarify how arbitrators will approach certain murky 
issues.89 Both of these features boost the legitimacy of the Benoam system 
by indicating to the public that decisions will be enforced promptly and 
principles will be applied evenly and fairly. 
“The Benoam case is a good demonstration of the ways in which 
digital technology can blur clear distinctions between ADR and formal 
dispute resolution, and, consequently shift the focus within ADR systems to 
systemic goals that have typically been associated with the court system.”90 
Not only does the system make impressive use of ODR, it retains a 
relatively high level of structure and formality, unlike traditional ADR 
techniques, which often do not.91 According to observers, “[i]n the case of 
uniform contracts, one party exerts absolute control while the other enjoys 
no control at all; in the case of Benoam, all users enjoy limited control over 
the system, resembling the remote sense in which parties consent to the 
power and authority of courts.”92 The fact that Israeli auto insurance 
companies elect to renew their agreements with Benoam each year speaks to 
their satisfaction with the system.93 Although Benoam arbitrates disputes 
between companies—as opposed to between consumers and companies—it 
provides a useful model for successful implementation of ODR in the 
context of high-volume, low-dollar insurance dispute resolution. 
Importantly, it avoids two drawbacks commonly complained of in 
traditional arbitration; participating parties perceive it to be both fair and 
affordable.  
  
 88. See id. at 546.  
 89. See id. at 550-51. 
 90. Rabinovich-Einy & Katsh, supra note 72, at 196. 
 91. See Rabinovich-Einy & Tsur, supra note 84, at 548-49. 
 92. Id. at 550.  
 93. See id. at 558. 
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C. The United Kingdom’s Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) 
The British FOS utilizes a private ombudsman system to resolve 
consumer disputes with banks, insurance providers, and financial service 
organizations, a popular approach that is also used to resolve consumer 
disputes in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.94 It began as an 
independent organization established by three British insurance companies 
in the 1970s for the purpose of resolving consumer disputes. Other 
insurance providers quickly joined, and companies in other industries 
developed similar organizations. By 2000, the British Parliament had joined 
these private ombudsman systems into one, evolving the FOS into an 
independent government entity.95  
The FOS’s consumer dispute resolution process can be divided into 
four parts. First, a complaining consumer must notify the company of their 
grievance. The company then has eight weeks to respond, and in doing so, it 
must provide the consumer with a brochure (created by the FOS) explaining 
their options for utilizing the FOS’s process.96 If the consumer is not 
satisfied with the company’s response, they may then submit their 
complaint to the FOS call center. Here, employees perform triage similar to 
the process undertaken by United States state insurance departments; they 
review the claims, gather information, and communicate with the parties to 
attempt a quick and easy resolution.97 If this cannot be accomplished, the 
employee handling the complaint elevates it to official “case” status. With 
this designation, the matter is assigned to an adjudicator, and the company 
involved is automatically fined £450.98 
The adjudicator serves the role of a mediator. They spend substantially 
more time than the employees at the call center gathering and reviewing 
information and communicating with the parties involved. They are 
statutorily required to manage these disputes while aiming to apply a “fair 
and reasonable” standard to the insurer’s actions. These adjudicators are not 
empowered to issue legally binding decisions, and they have no regulatory 
authority. They can, however, easily refer matters to the proper regulatory 
authority when complaints raise red flags.99 An impressive ninety-four 
percent of the complaints that reach an adjudicator are settled at this stage.100 
If the parties do not settle their dispute with the help of an adjudicator 
the matter is elevated to ombudsman review. The reviewing ombudsman 
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Winter] Reforming Consumer-Insurer Dispute Resolution 165 
may require insurers to pay up to £100,000, and although the final decision 
is binding upon the insurer, the insured is not precluded from litigating the 
dispute in a court of law.101 When reviewing complaints, ombudsmen use 
the entirety of the record created by the call center employees and the 
adjudicator, and—like adjudicators—they apply a “fair and reasonable” 
standard to the acts of the company. Final decisions are then shared with the 
parties and later made public, although the parties’ identities are not 
revealed. The six ombudsmen are high-ranking public officials, who, in 
addition to arbitrating claims, are responsible for managing the FOS. 102  
The FOS system is celebrated by companies and consumers alike, 
both for its efficiency and impartiality.103 Commentators attribute its 
popularity and success to a number of factors, two of which include: (1) its 
comprehensive tiered structure and (2) its status as a nonregulatory public 
entity.  
The FOS creates a clear and reliable framework that sees each 
consumer complaint through a well-established process; its involvement 
begins where the complaint starts (mandated reporting to the actual 
company) and does not terminate until the complaint has been resolved in 
some manner.104 The FOS enjoys an impressive rate of success at the 
mediation stage handled by adjudicators, which may be due in part to three 
factors: (1) the parties are aware of the looming possibility of ombudsman 
review if they cannot reach an agreement; (2) at the arbitration stage, the 
parties no longer have the opportunity to exert control over the outcome of 
the dispute; and (3) the final arbitration determination is binding (although 
consumers are not precluded from filing in court afterwards).105 Companies 
may be motivated to avoid the risk of being fined an unforeseen amount. 
Additionally, even employees who operate at the call center stage have 
some leverage when dealing with companies. If companies wish to resolve a 
dispute without incurring any fines from the FOS, they must do so at this 
stage; otherwise, they will be fined automatically when the complaint is 
elevated to an adjudicator for more substantial mediation.106 The 
architecture of the system gives the actors at each stage a meaningful role to 
play and adequate tools with which to operate. 
Furthermore, as a nonregulatory public entity, the FOS enjoys the trust 
and legitimacy afforded government agencies, which presumably are not 
biased toward the industries whose conduct they review.107 Yet the FOS’s 
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independence from regulatory responsibilities may make companies feel 
more comfortable being forthcoming about their transgressions. The FOS 
can pass issues along to the proper regulatory body when it sees fit, of 
course, but industry actors may find the degree of separation reassuring. 
Because it does not perform a regulatory function itself, its energies can be 
fully devoted to dispute resolution.108 Although the FOS system handles a 
much broader set of disputes than the Benoam system and uses an entirely 
different ADR process, like Benoam it avoids two problems often 
associated with traditional methods of arbitration: unfairness and prohibitive 
cost. 
III.  PROPOSAL 
This final section will introduce a proposal for a reformed first-party 
consumer auto insurance dispute resolution system in the United States. The 
description of the proposal will be followed by an explanation of how it 
incorporates the three recent trends in dispute resolution: (1) ODR; (2) the 
Benoam system in Israel; and (3) the British FOS. The section will conclude 
by explaining how this proposal would improve upon the current system. 
A.  Description 
This paper proposes the creation of an independent nonregulatory 
federal entity that would both mediate and arbitrate first-party consumer 
auto insurance complaints through a system of ODR, at no cost to 
consumers or insurers. For the remainder of the paper, the proposed entity 
will be called the Auto Insurance Complaint Bureau (AICB). Notably, 
unlike many proposals for insurance regulation reform, this system would 
not require the amendment or repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. Under 
the Act, the states currently have the right to reverse preempt the FAA when 
regulating the arbitration of disputes over insurance claims. This is because 
the FAA does not directly regulate the business of insurance. The statute 
Congress would pass in order to implement this paper’s proposal would 
directly regulate the business of insurance, and thus would not be subject to 
state law preemption under McCarran-Ferguson.109  
The federal government would establish the AICB wholly separate 
and apart from the FIO, and its employees would be encouraged to share 
market conduct concerns with the FIO as needed. As an initial matter, the 
ODR database would be designed and tested by private consultants, who 
would tailor the system to match the needs of the AICB—an entity 
preparing to: (1) process and review thousands of complaints dealing with 
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fact-specific, document-heavy claims; (2) mediate disputes, mostly through 
review of online documentation but occasionally through virtual 
teleconference meetings; (3) keep consumer case files protected and 
confidential; (4) issue precedential decisions to the public with the ability to 
select whether to keep the parties anonymous; (5) organize its employees 
and caseload by state; and (6) track the processing of all complaints in order 
to report certain metrics to the FIO.  
The AICB would be the mandatory and exclusive appellate step for 
dissatisfied auto insurance consumers looking to air first-party coverage 
grievances, and neither insurers nor insureds would have to pay to 
participate. The system would require that all complainants first attempt to 
resolve disputes directly with insurance companies before filing a claim 
with the AICB. Companies would have a maximum of eight weeks to 
resolve matters with an insured. Companies would also be required, during 
this eight-week period, to gather and organize all relevant records pertinent 
to an insured’s complaint. If the insured then decides to file a formal 
complaint with the AICB, the company would be required to upload all 
relevant case documents into the ODR database within one week of being 
notified of the complaint. This upload would include all documents relevant 
to the consumer’s policies with the insurer generally, as well as all 
documents related to the claim under review. The insurer would also be 
required to provide documentation of its communications with the insured 
during the recent period when their complaint was under review.  
Once the insured files an official complaint with the AICB, the 
complaint would be handled in no more than two phases. First, it would be 
assigned to a mediator specializing in the auto insurance laws of the 
insured’s state. All mediators would be full-time employees of the AICB. 
The mediator would perform an initial intake and review of the complaint 
and all accompanying documents provided by the insurer in the online 
database. The mediator would then determine whether the dispute has the 
potential to be resolved in the immediate short term without utilizing formal 
mediation techniques. If so, the mediator would attempt to do so. If not, 
they would undertake a more extensive review of the circumstances 
surrounding the complaint. The mediator would not only utilize the 
documents uploaded by the insurer, but they would also require the two 
parties—or their representatives—to answer a number of form questions 
regarding their perceptions of the dispute, goals for resolution of the 
dispute, and any potential points of compromise. Parties’ answers to these 
questions would be tracked and entered into an ongoing live data pool, 
which would be used in conjunction with mediator feedback to improve the 
utility of party forms in future mediations. Parties’ answers would also 
assist the mediator in attempting to reach a mutually agreeable outcome to 
their dispute.  
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If the mediator determined to undertake a more extensive review, the 
ODR system would alert mediators and parties alike to built-in deadlines 
guiding their complaint. The mediator would have the ability to override the 
system to extend deadlines in cases where doing so would be productive, 
but otherwise these deadlines would dictate the timeframe within which 
each dispute is mediated. Certain types of disputes, if consistently more 
complex and time-consuming to investigate, would default to an extended 
timeframe. System tracking of dispute data would assist in streamlining 
these deadlines over time. The mediator would apply the laws of the 
pertinent state when reviewing the facts and gauging how to assist the 
parties in reaching a just outcome.  
If, at the end of the predetermined mediation period, no settlement was 
reached between the parties, the mediator would forward the case to an 
arbitrator. Like mediators, all arbitrators would be full-time employees of 
the AICB. The arbitrator—who would also be assigned to handle 
complaints arising in the insured’s state—would have access to all 
documents in the database, including the records and notes from the 
mediator’s attempts to aid the parties in reaching a resolution. The arbitrator 
would also apply the appropriate state’s law to judge the actions taken by 
the insurer. Similar to the mediation stage, the ODR system would 
automatically calculate arbitration deadlines and alert the parties, including 
the arbitrator, to those deadlines. If one of the parties was dissatisfied with 
the arbitrator’s final decision, they would have the right to appeal to a panel 
of three different arbitrators. These arbitrators would apply a fair and 
reasonable standard of review to the proceedings and would make new 
inquiries of the parties only as needed. Arbitrator damage awards would be 
limited to $40,000, and this cap would be adjusted every five years for 
inflation. The final decision issued either by the assigned arbitrator or a 
panel of three reviewing arbitrators would be binding on both parties.  
These decisions would be released to the public, but the parties involved 
would be kept anonymous. Although not precedential, these decisions 
would provide useful examples of AICB interpretations and rulings, both to 
companies and to the public. 
All AICB employees, especially arbitrators, would be carefully 
selected based on qualifying knowledge and experience as well as 
demonstrations of impartiality. Further, parties to disputes would have the 
option of submitting allegations of bias against their mediator or arbitrator 
to the FIO for independent review and, if deemed necessary, investigation.  
Initially, this system would be limited to first-party auto complaints, 
the majority of which involve disputes over coverage (usually how much, if 
anything, an insured is owed) or delayed claim payments.110 This would 
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allow the program to have a meaningful impact on a large number of 
dissatisfied consumers without initially handling the added complexities of 
third-party claims. If, after a significant trial period, the AICB was 
successful, the legislature and by extension the system’s administrators 
could consider incorporating third-party consumer auto complaints as well.   
B. Incorporating Lessons from Dispute Resolution Trends 
The three recent developments in dispute resolution discussed in Part 
II figure heavily into the AICB proposal. From the ODR experiences of 
other entities, the proposal incorporates tailored online system design at the 
outset; carefully facilitated data gathering allowing for rich data 
improvements over time; and utilization of virtual “Mediation Room” 
techniques in real time.111 By utilizing ODR, the proposal aims to take 
advantage of the benefits realized by other organizations: namely, long-term 
cost efficiency, convenience for all participants, and transparency through 
online publication of arbitration outcomes.112  
Israel’s Benoam system provides an example of ODR operating 
efficiently and effectively and includes certain attributes that support this 
paper’s proposal. Although Benoam handles a different body of disputes—
subrogation claims between insurance companies—it provides a useful 
example of a binding online arbitration system focused on a subset of 
claims within the insurance industry. Benoam offers an impressive level of 
structure and formality, lending it the legitimacy an entirely online system 
might otherwise lack.113 The AICB proposal attempts to emulate these 
qualities by providing a clearly delineated step-by-step process and 
requiring participants to stick to a preordained timeline. Additionally, 
Benoam selects and publishes precedential decisions in order to give the 
public notice of how it will interpret certain types of disputes, to provide 
ongoing evidence of its utility, and to hold companies accountable for their 
actions.114 The AICB proposal borrows from this practice in part; it would 
publish all arbitration outcomes while keeping the parties anonymous.   
Finally, although the British FOS system covers a much broader range 
of consumer disputes than first-party auto insurance claims, it provides 
useful insights into the successful implementation of a third-party 
ombudsman service and serves as the foundation for certain elements of this 
paper’s proposal. First, the FOS utilizes a tiered system that begins by 
requiring consumers to log complaints directly with companies and moves 
through multiple stages that may lead to a binding arbitration decision (with 
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the option to appeal).115 Although the particulars of each AICB stage are 
unique, the proposal mirrors the FOS’s structured, multi-tiered approach. 
Additionally, the FOS’s status as a public entity with no regulatory power is 
key to its success; it garners trust and legitimacy from both the public and 
private companies.116 Its official yet independent status allows it to maintain 
a direct and meaningful connection to regulators without being so closely 
connected as to alienate companies.117 The AICB’s status as a nonregulatory 
government entity is modeled directly after the FOS, and like the FOS, the 
AICB would publish its decisions keeping the parties anonymous.  
C.  Improving Upon the Current System 
This paper’s proposal would improve upon the currently fragmented 
dispute resolution systems in a number of ways. Unlike the consumer 
complaint process offered by some state departments of insurance, the 
AICB program would provide a fully resourced avenue for consumers to air 
their grievances. It would exist for the sole purpose of resolving first-party 
consumer auto insurance disputes. First, this would answer the concerns of 
those who argue that state insurance departments fail to make consumer 
protection a priority.118 Second, proper program funding and staffing from 
the federal government would guarantee that adequate resources exist to 
support the enterprise of processing consumer complaints—presently 
lacking in a number of states.119  
Additionally, the AICB arbitration tier would be a fairer, more 
objective, and more convenient option for consumers than the private 
arbitration currently in place in most states. At present, arbitrators are 
typically selected by insurance companies; consumers must arrange their 
schedules to travel to hearings as necessary; consumers must take 
affirmative steps to trigger arbitration and may feel compelled to consult an 
attorney when doing so; and final decisions remain private, shielding 
unsavory industry practices from public view.120 In the AICB, mediators and 
arbitrators would be full-time employees of the AICB, and if necessary, 
parties questioning their objectivity would have the option of raising 
concerns with the independently operated FIO. By offering services online, 
the AICB would provide greater flexibility and avoid common logistical 
complications, such as travel costs and inflexible work schedules. 
Furthermore, consumers and insurers would already be active participants in 
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the AICB system before reaching the arbitration stage. After undergoing an 
unsuccessful attempt at mediating the dispute, if either party believed that 
further review might provide a more favorable outcome, they would be in a 
comfortable position to elevate the matter to arbitration. Once an arbitrator 
reached a decision, the result would be made available to the public without 
identification of the parties involved. This would prevent companies from 
being unfairly subjected to public judgment without the due process of law 
afforded by litigation, while still allowing the public to observe industry 
practices generally. 
Finally, in addition to providing an objective, fully operational, and 
convenient avenue for consumers to seek review of their complaints, the 
AICB would eliminate the burdensome up-front funding requirements of the 
current arbitration system.121 It would come at a cost to the government, as it 
would not require consumers to pay to file a complaint, nor would it compel 
insurance companies to fund the processing of complaints. Although this 
system would place a financial burden on the federal government—as its 
success would require adequate funding—it would have the positive effect 
of incentivizing consumers to voice their concerns without first pausing to 
consider the potential cost. Consumers who are currently forced to 
undertake this cost-benefit analysis may determine the potential payout is 
not worth the time and money required to arbitrate.  
The suggestion that state regulators, in response to local political 
pressures, may be more apt to handle consumer complaints adequately than 
federal regulators could be seen as a basis for arguing against this paper’s 
proposal.122 Upon closer examination, however, the concern is not warranted 
because the proposed AICB would handle consumer complaints, but would 
not perform a regulatory function. AICB mediators and arbitrators would 
merely follow applicable state laws and regulations, set by state legislators 
and administrators who would presumably consider local circumstances 
when passing and implementing insurance policy. 
CONCLUSION 
In 2008, Congress passed the Genetic Information Non-Discrimination 
Act (GINA) to protect Americans from employer and insurer discrimination 
based on genetic makeup.123 Prior to the Act’s passage, states had enacted a 
wide range of laws on the subject, and the protections available to citizens 
varied drastically from state to state.124 This important issue had the 
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potential to directly impact the majority of American citizens, and Congress 
chose to put an end to the glaring gaps and inconsistencies in genetic 
protection rights among the states by setting a federal policy. Although 
substantively different from the considerations of this paper, GINA provides 
an appropriate backdrop to its conclusions. 
This paper has addressed the inadequacies of first-party automobile 
insurance claims dispute resolution in the United States by proposing the 
creation of a federally administered system of online dispute resolution for 
consumers seeking third-party review of their insurers’ coverage 
determinations. Although this proposal argues for change on a modest scale 
compared to suggested reforms that would overhaul insurance regulation 
entirely, it does so purposefully, with an eye to practical considerations: (1) 
manageable implementation; (2) impacting a large number of consumers, 
whose options are currently inconsistent from state to state; and (3) freeing 
up resources for taxed state insurance regulators. Like genetic information 
protection rights before Congress enacted GINA, consumer options for 
appealing auto insurance claim determinations vary widely among the 
states, and in many cases are functionally nonexistent. This paper’s AICB 
proposal would improve the current system by providing a streamlined 
avenue for reviewing complaints lodged by all-too-often-unheard 
consumers of automobile insurance in the United States. 
 
 
